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Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to criticize the Commission’s approach to the 
application of Article 82 to the exclusionary abuses of the dominant firms. It 
is a very interesting and hot topic as the attitude of the Commission and the 
European Courts have many implications on the consumer welfare and total 
efficiency in common market and innovation capacity and the economic 
development of the European Union.  The old approach of the Commission 
towards the Article 82 has been criticized harshly as it does not utilize the 
new economic theories and the analysis used by the Commission and the 
European Courts was based on the formalistic definition of the abuses rather 
than the actual effect of the conduct on efficiency and consumer welfare.  
 
The new economic theories suggest that the exclusionary conducts of the 
dominant firms which are defined as abuse under the formalistic approach 
are actually efficiency and consumer welfare enhancing. Therefore, the 
intervention of the Commission in this area protects the competitors while it 
actually hampers the consumer welfare, efficiency and competition in the 
EU. This has affected the economic performance of the EU and the 
Commission was blamed because of its significant intervention in the 
business activities of the dominant firms. After all these criticisms, the 
Commission decided to modernize the approach towards the application of 
Article 82 to the exclusionary conducts. Therefore, the Commission 
published a Discussion Paper
1
 in December 2005 which aims to bring an 
effects-based and economics friendly approach to the exclusionary conducts 
of the dominant firms. The Commission put the interests of the consumers 
and the efficiency consideration over the interests of the competitors. The 
efficiency and consumer welfare enhancing role of the exclusionary 
conducts and the importance of focusing on the actual effect on the market 
instead of the formalistic definitions of the conducts are stressed in the 
Discussion Paper. However, the analysis proposed by the Commission was 
actually in line with the formalistic approach while the focus was on the 
anti-competitive effects of the exclusionary conducts of the dominant firms. 
This thesis will show that the Commission actually failed to bring an 
economics-based analysis in the application of Article 82. Three years after 
the Discussion Paper, the Commission published a Guidance Paper
2
 for an 
improvement in the formalistic approach but it is mostly inline with the 
Discussion Paper.  
                                                
1
 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, 19 December 2005, IP/05/1626 
2
 Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty 
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 13 December 2008, 
IP/08/1877 
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Abbreviations 
ECJ                                          European Court of Justice 
 
EC                                              European Community 
 
EC Treaty                                  Treaty establishing the European Community as   
                                                   amended in accordance with the Treaty of Nice                                                     
 
The Community Courts            European Court of Justice and the Court of First  
                                                  Instance 
 
ECR                                          European Court Reports 
 
OJ                                             Official Journal of the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Purpose  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to criticize the approach of the Commission to 
the application of Article 82 regarding the exclusionary conducts of the 
dominant firm. The European Approach to dominant firms has significant 
implications on the consumer welfare, total efficiency in the EU, innovation 
and economic development of EU. For that aim, the Commission has 
published a Discussion Paper which aims to bring an effects-based approach 
which is compatible with the new economic theories and to update the 
analysis of exclusionary conducts of the dominant firm.  This thesis aims to 
investigate whether the new approach of the Commission is really 
economics-based and whether the Commission is successful in increasing 
consumer welfare and efficiency in European market and in promoting 
innovation and economic development with the new approach to Article 82.  
 
1.2. Method and Material  
 
In order to analyze the old and new approach of the Commission to Article 
82, I have relied on EC Treaty provisions, case law of the Community 
Courts, the Commission’s documents mainly the Discussion Paper 
published in 2005 regarding the Article 82 and literature about the 
competition theories and the European Approach to competition law and 
Article 82. I will firstly provide the theoretical framework and compare the 
main competition theories with the European Approach to competition law. 
Then I will provide an explanatory part regarding the old attitude of the 
Community Courts and the Commission towards the application of Article 
82 to the exclusionary abuses based on the case law and EU legislation. In 
the third chapter, the new approach of the Commission towards the 
application of Article 82 to the exclusionary abuses will be criticized.  To 
illustrate the issues in which the Commission failed to bring a real effects-
based approach, the analysis proposed by the Discussion Paper will 
examined and criticized based on the reports and commentaries published.  
Moreover, the Guidance Paper will be analyzed briefly to show that the 
Commission is insistent on its formalistic approach regarding the 
exclusionary abuses of the dominant firms. In the last part, the suggestions 
will be provided for the Commission to revise the application of Article 82 
to exclusionary abuses. In this part, mainly the Federico Etro’s theory of 
market leaders will be utilized.   
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1.3. Delimitations  
 
This thesis criticizes the Commission’s attitude towards the application of 
Article 82 to the exclusionary abuses. For that aim, firstly three main 
competition theories are selected to analyze as these theories are the most 
important ones having the most significant effect on the competition law. In 
this section, the purpose is not to provide very basic economic concepts 
such as the characteristics of perfectly competitive or monopolistic markets. 
In the analysis of the new and old approach of the Commission to the 
Article 82, the exclusionary conducts of the dominant firms are focused and 
the conducts of the monopolists and the other types of abusive conducts of 
the dominant firm are held out of the scope of this thesis. An explanatory 
and detailed analysis of the Commission’s approach in Article 82 will not be 
provided instead the weak points of the Commission’ new approach 
suggested by the Discussion Paper will be discussed based on the arguments 
of the new economic theories.    
 
1.4. Disposition  
 
In order to examine the new approach of the Commission, I start with 
presenting the basic competition theories and the European Approach to 
competition law. To examine the attitude of the Commission and the 
Community Courts towards Article 82 and how the European Approach is 
formed, three main competition theories and their different level of effect on 
the European approach will be compared. Firstly, the Harvard School which 
has the most significant effect on the traditional EU approach to Article 82 
and which is the most formalistic one will be examined. Secondly, the 
Chicago School’s liberal and effects-based approach will be presented as it 
is utilized as a guiding star in the modernization of Article 82.  Post-
Chicago School is selected as the third competition theory because it has 
also significant on effect on the European Approach. Lastly, the European 
Approach to competition and the objectives of the Commission in the 
formation of its approach will be analyzed.      
 
Then, I will analyze the traditional approach of the Commission to the 
Article 82. Therefore, the Commission’s and the Community Courts’ 
attitude towards market definition, dominance and exclusionary abuses are 
analyzed with a focus on case law. The aim is to provide a brief analysis of 
the EU’s attitude to the abuse of dominant position.  
 
To examine the new approach of the Commission to Article 82, the 
Discussion Paper will be analyzed in detail in the third chapter. Firstly, the 
aim of modernization and the reason why the Commission intended to bring 
an effects-based approach to Article 82 will be presented. The Commission 
aims to modernize the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses in 
the light of the new economic theories. Therefore, Discussion Paper 
provides a new way of analysis in defining the relevant market, dominance 
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and exclusionary abuses of the dominant firm. This thesis aims to prove that 
the Commission’s new approach defined in the Discussion Paper is actually 
conflicting with the suggestions of new economic theories and with the 
purpose of bringing effects-based approach to Article 82. For that aim, the 
suggestions of the new economic theories and the proposed analysis in the 
Discussion Paper are compared with regard to market definition, 
determination of dominance, exclusionary abuses and objective justification 
and efficiency defense. The aim is to show that the Commission was still 
loyal to the old formalistic approach in the application of Article 82 to 
exclusionary abuses of the dominant position despite the fact that the aim of 
the Discussion Paper was determined as bringing effects-based approach. 
After the analysis of the Discussion Paper, the Commission’s Guidance 
Paper is examined to see if it improved the proposed analysis in the 
Discussion Paper. While the Guidance Paper is the most recent document 
from the Commission to analyze the attitude towards the Article 82, the 
focus is on the Discussion Paper in this thesis as the Guidance Paper is 
mostly in line with the Discussion Paper and there is not enough literature 
about it.  
 
In the last chapter of the thesis, I will provide some suggestions for the 
Commission to further modernize the application of Article 82 to 
exclusionary abuses of the dominant firms. For that aim, the theory of 
market leaders which is a viable alternative to old competition theories for 
the EU will be presented. I will analyze the theory of market leaders and 
provide suggestions for the Commission to improve the European Approach 
to Article 82 based on the propositions of this theory.  
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2. Competition Theory and The 
European Approach to 
Competition Law 
 
2.1. Harvard School 
 
One of the most important economic theories which have also significant 
effect in the formation of EC competition law is the Harvard School which 
is also called structure-conduct-performance theory. The Harvard School 
analyzes the interaction between the structure of an industry, the 
performance and the conduct of the firm. The structure of the industry such 
as the technological development or the concentration level determines the 
conduct of the firms such as the advertisement and R&D expenditures. The 
conduct of the firms at the end affects the performance of the industry in 
terms of the profits of the firms, the consumer welfare or technological 
development.  Therefore the government intervention to the structure of the 
industry through tax legislation or competition law affects the performance 
of the industry and the firm directly.
3
 
 
Mason who is the leading economist of Harvard School defines the structure 
as all the considerations in the market which affect the strategy and policies 
of the firm including all the buyers and sellers in the industry. He identifies 
types of structures which have effect on the conduct of the firm and its 
performance. For instance, if the structure of the market is close to pure 
competition conditions, the firm can only decide how much it wishes to sell 
at the price set by the market equilibrium.  If the market structure is 
monopolistic or oligopolistic, the firms can be able to set the price without 
considering the market forces. And if the entry barriers are low and the 
number of possible conspirators is high, the structure of the market is very 
suitable for collusion. Based on these assumptions, Mason suggests that the 
pure competition rules are in the public interest as the price is at the 
competitive level while the monopolistic structure is something that should 
be suppressed by the competition law.  
 
As a part of the Harvard School, the concentration doctrine explains the 
relationship between the number of firms operating in the industry and the 
performance of the firm. According to this doctrine, the high concentration 
in the market should be considered as high market power by the competition 
law. In market structures with small number of firms, the firms are able to 
affect the level of price with their individual business decisions. This 
doctrine falsely assumes that the high concentration cannot be the result of 
                                                
3
 Glader, Marcus, “The Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition 
Law and US Antitrust Law”, Lund University, Malmo, 2004 
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economies of scale or the innovative performance of the firms in one 
industry. Therefore, this doctrine is criticized because it suggests that the 
competition law should consider the high concentration in the market 
evidence to strong market power. Therefore, the high level of concentration 
is a market failure and should be justified by the government intervention. 
The competition authorities thus should follow an active policy against the 
mergers and concentration.
4
 The strong effect of Harvard School can be 
observed in EU Competition Law as the competition authorities still focus 
on the market share rather than entry barriers and support the small and 
medium sized companies.
5
  Although, these theories have still significant 
effect on EU competition law, the next generation of economists which 
represent the Chicago School criticized these theories harshly and argued 
that the high concentration can be simply the result of high efficiency and 
innovative efforts of the firms operating in that market.  
 
2.2. Chicago School  
 
Major attack to the Harvard School and the concentration doctrine came 
from the Chicago School which mainly argues for a free market system and 
avoids the necessity of government intervention through competition law. 
They think that the high concentration ratios do not necessarily result in 
monopoly profits or collusion. Instead, the high concentration ratios are 
result of different cost structures more specifically the economies of scale. 
The high concentration is observed in markets where the large scale 
production is economically more advantages.
6
 In other words, the firms 
operating at the maximum efficiency level gets larger quickly and their 
market share and sales increase accordingly which result in high 
concentration rates in this market. Therefore, the high concentration is 
something desirable whereas the real problem is the collusion which results 
in artificially high prices and restricted output level. 
7
 
  
The attitudes of Harvard and Chicago scholars are the same regarding the 
perfect competition condition which results in maximum efficiency level 
and consumer welfare. However, while the Harvard School argues for 
government intervention to make the market structure closer to the perfect 
competition conditions, the Chicago School considers these conditions a 
guiding star which should be achieved through free market forces. Therefore 
despite the concentration doctrine which considers the high concentration a 
market failure that should be remedied by competition law, according to 
Chicago scholars the high concentration is the result of superior 
performance of some firms with high efficiency level in time. Moreover, 
high concentration is absolutely necessary for greater efficiency levels in an 
industry. Therefore, the government intervention just creates a market 
                                                
4
 Hildebrand, Doris, “The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules”, 
Kluwer Law International, Second Edition, The Hague/London/New York, 2002  
5 Glader (2004)  
6
 HildeBrand (2002) 
7
 Glader (2004) 
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failure except for some horizontal mergers and disturbs the most efficient 
firms in one industry.   
 
Based on these arguments, it is suggested that for the competition laws the 
consumer welfare should be the most important value that guide all the 
decisions given by the courts and the aim should be increasing the economic 
efficiency. The courts should use detailed economic analysis of the facts of 
the case and empirical data to decide the conduct’s actual effect on 
consumer welfare and overall efficiency. According to the Chicago School 
the high concentration other than pure monopoly power should be 
considered as effective as perfect competition and the main job of the 
competition authorities should just control and eliminate the overtly 
collusive behaviors of the firms.
8
 The policies of the firms for profit 
maximization should not be hampered by the competition authorities and 
the aim should be remedying any inefficient actions of the firms that at the 
end affect the consumer welfare. Therefore, Chicago scholars argue that the 
area that the competition law should intervene should be narrowed with the 
assumption that the free market forces will find the best way without 
government intervention.
9
 
 
The effect of both Chicago and Harvard School can be observed in EC 
competition law which sometimes resulted in conflicting decisions. It 
should be noted that the policy of integration is the most important objective 
that should be achieved by the EC competition law. Although, the efficiency 
concept is getting more and more important in EU competition law, it 
cannot be expected that the Commission accords the same level of 
importance to efficiency as the Chicago School does. The further market 
integration is clearly conflicting with the unrestricted free market concept of 
Chicago School.
10
 Therefore it is clear that for a proper functioning 
competition law, there is a need for convergence between the Harvard 
School and Chicago School. Apparently, the European Approach which is 
very much affected by the Harvard School is unsuccessful in utilization of 
economic theories in antitrust cases whereas the arguments of Chicago 
School are against the protectionist attitude and common objectives of the 
European Union. One of the attempts to bring an alternative approach to 
Harvard and Chicago School was Post-Chicago School which is more 
supportive for government intervention and has also significant effect on the 
EU competition law.
11
 
  
                                                
8
 Hildebrand (2002) 
9 Glader (2004) 
10
 Rodger, J. Barry, “The Oligopoly Problem and the Concept of Collective Dominance: EC 
Developments in the Light of US Trends in Antitrust Law and Policy”, Columbia Journal 
of European Law, 25, Winter 1996  
11 Johansen, Erik , “I Say Antitrust; You Say Anticompetitive: Why bridging the Divide 
between US and EU Competition Policy Makes More Economic Sense”, Penn State 
International Law Review, 331, Fall 2005 
 9 
2.3. Post-Chicago School     
 
While the Chicago School argues that the government intervention through 
competition law actually hampers the competition in the market and 
decreases the level of efficiency and consumer welfare, the Post-Chicago 
School is more supportive for the government intervention. The Post-
Chicago Scholars think that especially the application of Article 82 is very 
important to restore competition and increase the consumer welfare in a 
concentrated market. It is argued that the free market forces cannot be able 
to remedy a market failure without government intervention in a 
monopolistic or in an oligopolistic market.
12
 The focus of Post-Chicago 
School is mainly on monopolistic markets and market imperfections such as 
information gap and high switching costs. It is argued that such markets are 
not able to remedy these failures alone and government intervention is 
necessary. The market imperfections such as information gap, high 
switching costs and entry barriers give unfair monopoly power to some 
firms even in a market with considerable number of small firms. Therefore, 
the Post-Chicago Scholars think that the competition authorities have the 
responsibility to prevent this monopoly from taking advantage of these 
market imperfections. The Post-Chicago School requires very detailed and 
complex economic analysis with a special focus on market dynamics and 
efficiency. Mainly, they criticize the Chicago School by saying that some 
market structures are not self correcting and allocative efficiency is not 
wealth maximizing.
13
  
 
The Post-Chicago School finds the definition of real market conditions in 
Chicago School and Harvard School as over simplified. The possible anti-
competitive practices and their effect on efficiency and consumer welfare 
cannot be defined easily especially when the new industries such as 
software and internet markets are considered. Therefore each case requires a 
very complex economic analysis which is the most important drawback of 
Post-Chicago School. It ignored the judicial and administrative difficulties 
of this extremely complicated approach. It is argued that the government is 
responsible to remedy the market failure but the administration agencies and 
courts may not be able to give the best decision using this complex 
economic analysis in each and every case. Although the Post-Chicago 
Scholars came up with impressive definitions of many market structures and 
conditions that may result in anti-competitive conduct, the judicial and 
administrative authorities are not able to create a totally new competition 
rules which can deal with all these complex economic analysis. The judges 
do not have the necessary skills and knowledge in economics while the 
economists are still not able to differentiate the anti-competitive actions 
from competitive ones with clear lines. To sum up, far from being a well 
                                                
12 Hovenkamp, Herbert, “Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique”, Columbia 
Business Law Review, 257, 2001 
13
 Johansen (2005)  
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functioning alternative approach to Harvard and Chicago School, the Post-
Chicago School created many problems.
14
  
2.4. The European Competition Law 
Development  
 
In January 1958, with the Articles 85 and 86 (currently Article 81 and 82) in 
Rome Treaty, the agreements and concerted practices which restrict 
competition and the abuse of dominant position became illegal in the 
Community. These Articles were designed for the most important objective 
of the Community which is the progressive integration and unification of the 
Member States. Therefore, the wording of the legislative material and cases 
from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) should be analyzed under the light 
of this fact. After including the competition law in Rome Treaty, the first 
influential effect came from Germany which was the first Member State 
having competition rules in EEC. The competition law of Germany was 
created by a panel of scholars which is called Freiburg School and they 
affected the competition rules in EEC in the first years. Freiburg scholars 
considered the competition law one of the most important elements of 
economic system in addition to freedom to conclude contract and guarantee 
for property rights. Until the 1990s, the main concern of European 
competition law was the market integration but not the practices of the firms 
which might distort competition and this attitude had been supported both 
by the Commission and the ECJ until the first modernization attempts.
15
 
 
2.5. The European Approach 
 
In 1960s, the European Union created a new approach to competition law 
combining Freiburg, Chicago, Post-Chicago and Harvard Schools which is 
called European School.  The ambition of the Community is to integrate all 
the national markets and create one common market. The allocational 
efficiency should be promoted by further liberalization of the national 
markets. To maximize the efficiency and maintain a well functioning 
economic market, the main instrument used by the Commission is the 
competition law. Therefore, the effect of this objective can be observed in 
the European Approach to competition law. Although, at the beginning 
Freiburg School had significant effects, it was just thought and was lack of 
analytical models. There were three main theories, Chicago, Harvard and 
Post-Chicago Schools which were suggesting different applied models of 
thought. The Commission created a conceptual framework considering the 
European social market models and the objectives of the Treaty. The 
Chicago was definitely conflicting with the common objectives and their 
arguments are mainly ignored by the Commission while the effect of 
                                                
14
 Hovenkamp (2001) 
15 Weitbrecht, Andreas, “From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond: the First 50 Years of 
European Competition Law”, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 29, No.2, 2008, pp 
81-88 
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Harvard School is significant on European competition law. Therefore, the 
Commission created a system which combines the structure-conduct-
performance theory with Post-Chicago School which is called extended -
conduct-performance framework. Instead of assuming that the structure 
affects the conduct and at the end the performance of the market, the 
Commission considered that these three elements are in interaction and 
performance also affects the structure of the market. Although this attitude 
has many problems, it is still considered that some market conditions are 
prerequisite for anti competitive conducts. Therefore, in the market 
conditions defined by Harvard School as unsuitable for anti-competitive 
conducts, it is unlikely that the Commission finds the conduct in question as 
anti-competitive.  
 
However, it is obvious that the attitude of Commission especially in the 
application of Article 82 requires a deeper economic analysis. This is mainly 
because the suggestions of the Harvard School regarding the dominant firms 
got obsolete. The tendency in the new economic theories which suggest that 
the monopolistic or oligopolistic markets structures may be the result of 
increased efficiency and consumer welfare outdated the old suggestions of 
structure-conduct-performance theory. Especially in innovative markets a 
proper welfare analysis, which does not just consider the high prices but 
also the other elements affecting the consumer welfare such as the 
introduction of new and high quality products or the amount of R&D 
expenditures, is required. This created a need for deep economic analysis 
and giving priority to the effect on consumer welfare and efficiency in 
addition to the objectives of the common market in Article 82 cases.
16
 In 
1990s, the competition law in EU has started to be Americanized and the 
consumer welfare and efficiency considerations got greater emphasis from 
the Commission.
17
 Currently, it is still evolving and a new approach is 
followed by the Commission.  
 
2.6. Conclusion  
 
Three main competition theories which are Harvard School, Chicago School 
and Post-Chicago School are analyzed in this section. The Harvard School 
is the oldest one among them and bases its arguments on the old economic 
theories and traditional market structures. While it is highly formalistic and 
has been criticized harshly by the next generation economic theories, the 
Harvard School is the competition theory having the most significant effect 
on EU competition law. The Chicago School which outdated the many 
presumptions of Harvard School is considered as too liberal and conflicting 
with the objectives of the common market by the Commission. The Chicago 
School righty recognized the importance of economics-based analysis in 
competition law and criticized the formalistic approach in abuse of 
dominant position cases. The effect of Chicago School is very limited in EU 
                                                
16
 HildeBrand (2002), pp158-169 
17
 Andreas (2008) 
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competition policy while it is highly appreciated in US Antitrust. The Post-
Chicago aimed to provide an alternative approach especially for EU 
competition law but the suggested way of analysis and methodology is 
found as extremely complicated and complex which may result in serious 
administrative and judicial difficulties. Since the Post-Chicago School is 
more formalistic than the Chicago School and gives higher support for 
government intervention, its effect is stronger in EU competition law.  In 
1960s, the EU created its own approach, EU Approach, which is affected by 
all these theories. The EU Approach puts the objectives of the common 
market especially the further integration between the Member States over 
the interest of consumers and efficiency considerations. This attitude has 
been criticized because of its very formalistic approach and lack of deep 
economic analysis.  
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3. The European Approach to 
Abuse of Dominant Position 
 
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community mainly 
prohibits any abuse of dominant position by stating that "any abuse by one 
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States”. In 
Article 82, four possible abusive practices are provided which are very 
broad and non-specific in language.
18
 However before the analysis of 
whether the dominant firm abused its market power or not, the relevant 
market should be defined and whether or not the firm is dominant in the 
relevant market should be decided.   
 
3.1. Defining the Relevant Market  
 
While defining the market, firstly, the Commission analyzes the product 
market. A firm can only have dominant position for specific type of 
products or services. If the definition of product market is narrow, it is 
easier to establish the dominance in the defined product market. Secondly, 
the Commission defines the geographic market which is the territory where 
all the traders compete in the same or sufficiently homogenous conditions of 
competition in terms of the defined products and services. In the third step 
of the analysis, the Commission checks if the market has temporal factor or 
not. A firm may have market power in a product market just in a specific 
time of the year because the competitor products may be available 
seasonally.
19
 For the definition of relevant market, the Commission 
published a Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Competition Law.
20
 The aim of the Commission’s Notice is to 
bring a more economics-based analysis and predictability to the 
Commission’s approach.
21
 The Discussion Paper also refers to the 
Commission’s Notice for a deeper understanding of the methodology in the 
definition of relevant market.   
 
 
 
                                                
18 Dibadj, Reza, “Article 82:Gestalt, Myths, Questions”, Santa Clara Computer and High 
Technology Law Journal, 615, May 2007  
19
 Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne, “EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials” Fourth Edition,  
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 
20 Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant market for the Purposes of Community 
Competition Law, 1997, OJ C 372, ,p. 5–13 
21
 HildeBrand (2002) 
 14 
3.2. Dominance 
 
After defining the relevant product, geographical and temporal elements of 
the market, the Commission investigates if the firm has dominant position in 
the defined market. In United Brands
22
, the Court states that the dominant 
firm has the strength of preventing the effective competition in the relevant 
market and can behave independently of its competitors, customers and 
consumers. To establish the dominance of the firm, the Commission utilizes 
two elements: the market share of the firm and other factors serving to 
reinforce its dominance. The market share analysis is the central of 
determination of market power according to the Commission and the 
Community Courts. In United Brands, the Court held that possession of 40-
45 percent of the relevant market is an indication of freedom of action 
which has central importance in determination of dominance. Even if the 
firm has significant amount of market share, the other factors such as entry 
barriers, economies of scale and vertical integration are also analyzed. 
However, despite the suggestions of new economic theories, the existence 
of high market share is the most important factor in the analysis of 
dominance in EU competition law. 
23
 
 
3.3. Abusive Practices  
 
The Article 82 provides a list of possible abusive actions but this list is non-
exhaustive and any other actions of the firms that are proved to be anti-
competitive can be liable under Article 82. The aim of the Article is not to 
regulate the monopolistic market but the abusive behaviors of the 
monopoly. Therefore, the acquisition of monopoly power is not illegal but 
abusing this power is forbidden under Article 82.  The abusive activities 
defined by EU competition law can be categorized under two main groups: 
the exploitative actions which are relevant for monopolistic markets and 
anti-competitive actions of dominant firms. The monopolist exploits its 
market power through abusive actions against the market players in different 
levels by excessive pricing, tie-in sales or discriminatory pricing. These 
abusive actions cannot be observed in a competitive market so government 
intervention is necessary to remedy such a market failure through 
competition rules.  
 
In abusive actions, the dominant firm takes advantage of its dominant 
position through for instance vertical and horizontal mergers, refusal to 
supply, fidelity rebates, and exclusive or selective distribution systems. 
Such activities can be observed in highly competitive markets but they 
weaken the competition in the context of dominant position. In other words, 
the dominant firm has special responsibility to refrain from actions which 
may have anti-competitive effect while such actions can be encouraged for 
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the small firms. This concept was clarified in AKZO
24
 Case in which the 
Commission provided that the dominant firm has the right to compete with 
the other small firms in the market and may exclude because of greater 
efficiency level but not by way of anti-competitive actions. That is to say, 
the dominant firm has a special responsibility and is not totally free in its 
strategic decisions against the other small firms operating in the market.
25
 
The Commission did not utilize deep economic analysis and the ruling was 
definitely under the influence of Harvard School. The same type of non-
economic type of analysis can be observed in different types of abuses 
especially in the exclusionary abuses.  
 
3.3.1. Predatory and Excessive Pricing  
The Commission’s formalistic approach in case of predatory pricing has 
been harshly criticized. In Tetra Pak II
26
, the Court ruled that if the 
dominant firm keeps the prices below certain cost thresholds, this pricing 
strategy should be considered predatory and anti-competitive which is liable 
under Article 82. Although Tetra Pak argued that the recoupment is 
necessary to find such an action as abusive, the Court rejected that argument 
and added that the risk of eliminating the competition is enough to find the 
predatory pricing strategy liable under Article 82.
27
 This attitude is 
definitely conflicting with the Chicago School and the recent economic 
theories which suggest that keeping the prices below a certain threshold is 
anti-competitive as long as the market is eliminated from competition. 
Actually such a pricing strategy improves the consumer welfare by offering 
low prices for a long time and the empirical data show that it is very 
unlikely that the dominant firm can really eliminate competition in such a 
market and recoup its losses in the future. 
28
 
 
United Brands is the leading judgment regarding another abusive action 
which is excessive pricing. The Court ruled that the excessiveness of the 
prices can be determined based on the production costs and the price set by 
the dominant firm can be found abusive based on this production costs or 
compared to the prices of competing products. However, the Commission 
was aware that the determination of production costs is a very difficult task 
especially in such big and complex corporations. The judgment was 
criticized a lot because it was obvious that the Court was lack of economic 
understanding and ignored the fact that the actual cost structure of dominant 
firm cannot be determined in this way. It can be again referred to Chicago 
School and new economic theories which suggest that using the production 
cost of a dominant firm and comparing the prices with the competing 
products to determine if the prices are excessive or not is an over simplified 
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and wrong analysis because the production cost of the dominant firm can be 
very low due to the efficiency gains and economies of scale. 
29
   
 
3.3.2. Tying and Bundling  
Bundling means selling two products together while tying is a more legal 
concept which occurs when the purchase of tying product is made 
conditional on the purchase of another good. According to EU competition 
law, these two products should be “separate products” while this definition 
is not meaningful in economic theories. It is economically not possible to 
really decide if the tying and tied products are separate or not. Although 
tying arrangements are listed among the possible abusive practices of 
dominant firm, tying is a very common commercial practice of the firms. 
Every seller would refuse to break down its product into smaller 
components while it is true that there will be demand for these small 
components by the consumers. There are two main theories regarding the 
tying arrangements. The classical approach provides that tying is generally 
an anti-competitive action and the business purpose achieved by tying 
arrangements can be also achieved through less restrictive ways. The more 
economics-based approach in Chicago School states that tying is generally 
efficiency enhancing and pro-competitive. The EU approach has been closer 
to the classical approach in which the per se prohibition is applied in tying 
cases without considering the real effect on consumers. The tying practice of 
the dominant firm is analyzed with reference to its form but not to its actual 
effect. Although, in Microsoft
30
 Decision, the Commission recognized the 
possible efficiency gains of tying arrangements, the starting assumption is 
still in conflict with the new economic theories and suggests that tying is 
generally anti-competitive. 
31
    
 
3.3.3. Rebates    
The ECJ and the Commission has considered the fidelity discounts and 
rebates abuse of dominant position under Article 82. In fidelity discounts, 
the dominant supplier of a product requires the customers to make exclusive 
purchasing agreement for a substantial discount. By way of doing this, the 
dominant firm creates entry barriers and prevents the competing firms from 
entering the market. While the quantity discounts are acceptable under 
Article 82, the fidelity rebates are fined heavily by the Commission. ECJ 
provided in Hoffman-La Roche Case
32
 that the fidelity rebates making 
discrimination against the customers purchasing the same amount of 
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products from the dominant firm according to whether they make business 
with the competing firms is a serious abusive conduct and unjustifiable.
33
 In 
Michelin
34
 Case, the ECJ provided a similar conclusion in which it states 
that the type of fidelity discount system in question limits the customers’ 
choice and makes the access of other dealers to the market more difficult. 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the fidelity discount in question cannot be 
economically justified. The Court in these two cases did not analyze the 
relationship between the discount system and the cost structures of 
Hoffman-LaRoche or Michelin. The attitude of the ECJ and the 
Commission has been criticized because of the lack of sufficient economic 
reasoning in the rulings and cost-based standard to analyze the fidelity 
discounts and rebates. 
35
    
 
3.3.4. Refusal to Supply 
Refusal to deal as an abusive conduct means that the dominant firm refuses 
to provide service or supply goods to an undertaking on reasonable terms. 
This conduct is abusive when the products or service provided by the 
dominant firm are key inputs for the other undertaking to be able to reach 
the end customers. Refusal to deal especially weakens the competition in the 
market when the depended undertaking is a competitor of the dominant 
firm. 
36
  
 
The Commission has a strict approach and argues that the dominant firm has 
“special responsibility to supply” where an undertaking is depended to the 
dominant firm to be able conduct business. The leading case regarding the 
EU approach to refusal to deal cases is the Commercial Solvents
37
 in which 
a dominant firm refused to supply a raw material which was key input for 
the depended undertaking. The dominant firm refused to supply because it 
intended to enter the market in the future and tried to eliminate competition 
before entering the market. ECJ emphasized the intention of the dominant 
firm to weaken the competition and declared that refusal to supply to 
exclude a competitor in one market before entering this market is abusing 
the dominant position. According to the Commission, the dominant firm has 
a duty to supply and such an action is abusive unless the dominant firm has 
reasonable justification for its action. This case has been criticized a lot 
because of the lack of sound economic analysis and qualitative analysis. 
Although, in the later judgments the Court used better analytical framework 
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and economic analysis, the EU approach to refusal to deal cases is still 
found to be poor by the scholars.
38
 
 
The problem with the EU approach is that it is forsakes the economic 
efficiency gain for the short-run interest of the consumers. The EU over 
emphasizes on the “essential facilities doctrine” and does not use economic 
analysis in refusal to deal cases. However, the new economic theories 
suggest that EU’s Approach can actually hamper the competition in the long 
run and decrease the incentive of the dominant firm to invest in areas which 
will be opened to competitors by the Court orders. Therefore, the 
competitors may not want to invest in their own facilities because they 
consider that the Court will provide access to these facilities. Such a 
competition policy hampers the innovative activities, decreases the 
dynamism and efficiency level in the market. 
39
 After all the criticism it got 
in Commercial Solvents Case, the ECJ applied the essential facilities 
doctrine in a narrow sense and considered the significance of encouraging 
innovation and investment by the dominant firm in Bronner
40
 Case . In 
Bronner Case, an Austrian newspaper group holding a dominant position 
refused to deliver newspapers of a small publisher though its national home-
delivery service. The small firm brought action against this action and the 
national court referred to ECJ to determine if this action was abuse of 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 82. The Court brought 
three criteria for the conduct of refusal to deal to be abuse under Article 82.  
 
Firstly, whether the refusal is likely to eliminate all the competition in the 
market by the dominant firm or not should be analyzed. This criterion is 
quite different from US approach which is very much affected by Chicago 
School. So the question is not really if the competition would be eliminated 
in that market or not but whether the undertaking in question could survive 
without the service or product provided by the dominant firm or not. The 
second criterion is if this conduct is objectively justified or not. And the 
third one is if the service or product refused to be supplied is indispensable 
to business in that downstream market. Apparently, in Bronner Case one of 
the most important reasons of the change in the Court’s attitude towards the 
essential facilities doctrine was the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs
41
 
which was influenced by the recent economic theories. He suggests that the 
application of this doctrine decreases the incentive of the firms to make 
investment. Although the EU’s approach may have positive effects on static 
economy, it will have negative effects on the dynamic economy. Secondly, 
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he referred to the US approach and suggested that the dominant firm should 
also have significant market power in the downstream market. Lastly, 
Jacobs emphasized the recent economic theories which suggest that the 
regulation of such markets is very costly and does not provide enough 
benefits which may outweigh the associated costs. 
42
 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
 
To sum up, although both the EU and US which is more influenced by 
Chicago School and recent economic theories acknowledged the importance 
of promoting innovation in refusal to deal cases, their attitudes are 
significantly different. EU considers the monopolists or dominant firms 
refusing to supply an obstacle to enhancement of innovation in one market, 
US argues that they improve the innovation. Actually, this divergence of 
attitude can be observed in all types o exclusionary abuses. As it can be 
observed in the European 2005 Discussion Paper, the EU is trying to solve 
this divergence problem and to utilize a more economics-based approach in 
these cases. However, the problem is that the EU competition law should be 
renewed and a more economics-based approach should be applied. While 
the US is using the economic analysis more and more in abuse of dominant 
position cases, EU has been still under the influence of Harvard School and 
is following a formalistic approach prohibiting the practices of dominant 
firms due to the legal form not on the grounds of economic analysis and 
effect on consumers.
43
 The most important reason of this approach is that 
the EU Competition law is not just about economic analysis and 
microeconomics but also is a part of EU policy for further integration and 
harmonious functioning of the internal market. While the entry barriers are 
being dismantled in the Union through abolishing the tariff and non-tariff 
barriers between the Member States, the Commission cannot let the private 
entities to create barriers through concerted practices or abuse of dominant 
position. Therefore, the new approach should not jeopardize these common 
objectives of the Treaty by modernizing the EU competition law through the 
utilization of more and more economic analysis.
44
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4. Modernization of Article 82 
and the Commission’s New 
“Effects-Based Approach” 
 
4.1. The reasons for the Modernization of 
Article 82 
 
 
For years, the EU competition law has been criticized for its formalistic 
approach but these criticisms did not gain much attention until mid-1990s. 
In 1980s, the Chicago School significantly affected the US competition law. 
The divergence between US antitrust and EU competition law became 
apparent in 1990s and the Commission recognized the significance of the 
criticisms. Therefore, the Commission started to work in collaboration with 
US officials to learn more about the US antitrust and the economic approach 
they are utilizing. After many meetings and joint projects, the number of the 
Commissioners looking for a modernized EU competition law which is 
more affected by the Chicago School increased. Another factor was the 
economic performance of US during the 1990s which was better than EU’s 
performance. Many scholars blamed the Commission for its significant 
interventions in business activities and called for a more liberalized market 
for the European firms to be able to compete with the US firms. 
45
 
 
After all the discussions and criticism against the formalistic approach of 
EU competition law, in December 2005 the Commission published a 
Discussion Paper regarding the exclusionary abuses of dominant firms 
under Article 82. The Discussion Paper provides for an effects-based 
approach in which increasing efficiency and consumer welfare will be the 
principles in the application of Article 82. The effect-based approach argues 
for utilization of more economic analysis and the general approach is closer 
to Chicago School liberalization.
46
 The modernization process includes two 
components. First one is weakening the effect of common objectives of the 
EU such as further market integration on EU competition law. The new 
objectives are defined as increased consumer welfare and promotion of 
efficiency. The second component is to redefine the methods and standards 
of competition based on these new objectives. These two components 
together created the new approach of the EU competition law which is so 
called “economics-based approach” or “effects-based approach”. 
47
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Economics-based approach argues that the ultimate goal of the competition 
law is to protect the rights of the consumers but not the competitors. 
Competition is necessary for the firms to respond to the needs and wants of 
the consumers and offer high quality products with lower prices and higher 
variety. However, competition is a natural process in which the more 
efficient firms replace the less efficient firms. Therefore, economics-based 
approach aims to create a more competitive European economy by 
increasing the total efficiency and consumer welfare in the EU.  
 
Economics-based approach provides mainly two benefits. The effects-based 
analysis requires a deep economic investigation in each case to evaluate the 
effect of the dominant firm’s conduct on the specific market. By focusing on 
the effect of the conduct rather than the form of the conduct, the possibility 
of the firm to circumvent the competition rules by adopting different 
business practices to achieve the same anti-competitive effect is decreased. 
Therefore two different practices which result in same anti-competitive 
effect on the market are treated in the same way. Secondly, effects-based 
approach guarantees that some pro-competitive conducts which could be 
considered as abusive practices under the formalistic approach will be 
evaluated objectively. It is true that some business practices can have 
different effects in different circumstances: they can promote innovation in 
some cases while they can distort competition in other cases. Therefore, the 
effects-based approach can analyze these cases with a focus on their real 
effect on consumer welfare and total efficiency gain and can provide the 
most objective and correct analysis.
48
  
 
4.2. The Discussion Paper and the New 
Effects-Based Approach: Is the 
Commission’s New Approach Really 
“Economics-Friendly”?  
 
As it is mentioned before, the analysis of Article 82 constitutes two-step 
test. Firstly, it should be established that the firm which is investigated is 
enjoying a dominant position with significant market power on the relevant 
market. When this is established, whether the conduct of the firm is abuse or 
not should be analyzed. During this analysis, the focus of the Commission 
which is also supported by the Courts is on the legal form of the conduct 
rather than the actual effect of this conduct on competition. The effects-
based approach suggests that the conduct of dominant firm can be pro-
competitive and consumer welfare enhancing although it can be defined as a 
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clear abuse according to the wording of Article 82. Some conducts of the 
dominant firm such as fidelity rebates or tying can be harmful for the other 
small firms in the market while it is very beneficial for the consumers as 
these practices may deliver immediate benefits to the consumers in the form 
of low prices or unique product offering. Therefore, the Discussion Paper 
points out that the real effect on consumers and efficiency should be 
analyzed in the second step instead of directly calling the conduct as an 
abuse based on the definitions of old economic theories. This attitude has 
also implication on the definition of dominant firm. Considering the fact 
that these conducts are adopted by the non-dominant firms frequently and 
they are not considered as abuse, the investigation of the conduct should not 
be based on the fact that the firm is dominant but be based on the effect of 
the conduct on consumer welfare and efficiency. 
49
 In this section, the new 
attitude brought by the Discussion Paper and whether the Paper provides a 
real economics-based approach to Article 82 or not is analyzed in detail.  
 
4.2.1. Market Definition and Dominance  
The first phase of Article 82 analysis is defining the market and verifying 
the existence of a dominant position. The Discussion Paper mainly refers to 
the Commission’s Notice regarding the definition of a relevant market. 
However, it adds to the Commission’s current attitude in one issue which is 
“cellophane fallacy”. It is provided that the inability to increase the prices 
without significant substitution does not necessarily show wider markets. 
Instead, it could reveal that the prices are set at supra-competitive level. 
Therefore, “cellophane fallacy” is an easy to apply tool to avoid this 
problem.
50
  
 
Regarding finding the dominance, the Discussion Paper defined the 
dominant position as a position having significant amount of market power 
which enables the dominant firm on the relevant market to behave 
independently from its competitors, customers and consumers. From this 
definition, a firm to be considered as dominant should have a leading 
position on the market without effective competitive constraints while the 
dominant firm and other players acting on the market. Based on this 
definition, there can be two types of markets which should be analyzed 
under Article 82: one is the pure monopoly situation in which the dominant 
firm is the only player on the market and second is the market leadership in 
which the dominant firm has other competitors on the market. Second 
scenario which is the most controversial and problematic situation can be 
analyzed under two groups. In the first one, there are entry barriers; the 
number of competitors is set exogenously so the dominant firm can really 
act independently. In the second scenario which is more frequently 
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observed, there are not significant entry barriers and the competition in the 
market is effective. In this case, aggressive strategies can be applied by the 
dominant firm to maintain its market position in the market. However, the 
economic realities are conflicting with the Discussion Paper’s definition as 
these aggressive strategies are usually beneficial for the consumers and are 
routinely applied strategies by all the firms on the market. 
51
  
 
Therefore, at this point the Discussion Paper creates ambiguity by saying 
that when the entry is easy by the competitors, a high market share is not 
really an indication for dominance. Therefore, the Commission should 
assess whether the entry would have been easy and immediate enough to 
prevent the dominant firm from charging price above competitive level.
52
 
Moreover, it is stated that when the firm with substantial market share is 
compelled by the other players on the market for a price reduction, it is 
unlikely to find dominance on this market. Although, these two suggestions 
look like reasonable, the new economic theories go further by saying that in 
these circumstances dominance can never be found out. Because when the 
entry barriers are significantly low and the competitors are strong enough to 
force for a price reduction, the firm with high market share cannot act 
independently which shows the non-existence of substantial market power.
53
   
 
The Discussion Paper stresses upon the market share which is still 
considered as the decisive factor for recognition of market power. Although, 
the product differentiation is also mentioned as a proxy to assess the market 
power of a firm, the fact that the structural indications do not always 
provide the correct tools to measure the market power is not stressed 
enough. 
54
  The Commission’s emphasis on the market share is conflicting 
with the modern economic theory. The market leaders have higher market 
shares when there is effective competition in the market and the potential 
entrants stand as a threat for the dominant firm. If the dominant firm is 
constrained with effective competition, it adopts aggressive pricing and 
investment strategies and tries to be more efficient.  Thus the dominant firm 
gets larger and expands its market share.  This means that there is no certain 
positive correlation between the market power and market share.
55
 In the 
EAGCP’s report, this fact is rightly recognized and it is provided that the 
structural indicators which are proxies for dominance can be the right tool in 
some cases but not all the cases especially in high-tech sectors and New 
Economy industries such as computer hardware and software, online 
businesses and biotechnology.
56
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The Discussion Paper also fails to bring a new approach to the problem of 
dynamic versus static analysis of the market. In high-tech and New 
Economy industries, the competition is dynamic and any static analysis of 
the market which reveals a large market share of a firm does not mean that 
this firm has market power. In a static analysis, the potential competition 
and the R&D investments made by the future competitors (and this situation 
is frequently observed in New Economy industries) are ignored. Therefore, 
the static and market-share-based analysis of the Discussion Paper may 
come to the conclusion that the firm with large market share has significant 
market power in a specific market while this market is highly competitive in 
dynamic sense. The static analysis of the dominance, which suggests that 
large market share which has been held for some time is an indication for 
dominance, is misleading in high-tech industries. The firm with high market 
share should invest in R&D and innovate to preserve its market share in 
high-tech industries when they are confronted with effective competition. 
Therefore this firm stays as a market leader for some time because of its 
aggressive investment policies while there is effective competition in the 
market. 
57
 
 
Although the promise of the Discussion Paper is being effects-based and 
more economics friendly in the assessment of the market definition and 
dominance, the message is not clear and the new approach fails to be 
economics-based in some cases. It should be stated that the establishment of 
dominance should be based on careful and detailed economic analysis of the 
real conditions of the market instead of stressing the significance of the 
market share in the analysis. It should be clarified that the substantial market 
share is not synonym of market power and dominance. Even a company 
with 100 percent market share can be non-dominant if there is effective 
competition in the market as it is in high-tech industries. In high-tech 
industries where high fixed costs of production and R&D can be observed 
as entry barriers, the market leader usually does not adopt anti-competitive 
practices mainly because of the threat of potential entrants. These entry 
barriers do not make the entry impossible and the firm with high market 
share is still confronted with effective competition. Therefore, this issue 
should be elaborated by the Commission in the future to provide an 
unambiguous guideline for the firms especially for the ones in New 
Economy industries. 
58
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4.2.2. Exclusionary Conducts  
4.2.2.1. Predatory Pricing  
 
Regarding the predatory pricing, Discussion Paper suggests that it is an 
illegal conduct under Article 82 if the dominant firm utilizes this pricing 
strategy to protect or strengthen its position in the market. Moreover, 
predatory pricing is a relevant abuse as long as the firm practicing this 
strategy is a dominant firm. In predatory pricing, the Discussion Paper 
rightly recognized that this strategy only makes sense when the dominant 
firm is able to recoup its short-term losses in the future. Although this 
approach to predatory pricing is economics-based and was not used in old 
approach, the Commission does not consider the proof of future recoupment 
necessary to find the conduct as abuse of dominant position. 
59
  
 
The Discussion Paper analyzes the predatory pricing strategies under two 
groups: when the price is below average avoidable cost which is the average 
marginal cost of the extra output and when the price is above the average 
avoidable cost but below average total cost. When the price of the dominant 
firm is below the average total cost, it is considered as a certain abuse 
because the firm could have avoided this cost when it had not produced a 
discrete amount of extra output which is subject to abuse. This theory is in 
line with the old economic theory which suggests that the price which is 
below the marginal cost always has predatory purpose. The Discussion 
Paper replaces the average variable cost with average avoidable cost.  
However, this new approach is also criticized because the average avoidable 
cost can be higher than the right theoretical concept when it also includes 
the fixed costs. Moreover, measuring the average avoidable cost rightly is 
very difficult because it is almost impossible to isolate the cost of extra 
output from the total output. In addition, the pricing strategy of keeping the 
prices below marginal cost is an ordinary pricing strategy in some cases 
such as in presence of network externalities. Therefore, the usage of average 
avoidable cost instead of average variable cost does not provide the best 
results for the analysis of predatory pricing. 
60
  
 
In this case, according to the Discussion Paper, the dominant firm can 
justify this conduct by saying that it is just minimizing its losses for instance 
in case of strong learning effect and start up costs. However, this approach 
is conflicting with the general EU competition rules as the predatory pricing 
cannot be justified based on efficiency defense when the price of the 
dominant firm is below the average avoidable cost in predatory pricing 
cases.
61
 Moreover, the list of possible justifications is missing a very 
important component which is the network effects whose effect is very 
similar to learning effect. 
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The second case in which the dominant firm charges prices above the 
average avoidable cost but below average total cost is more controversial. 
The Discussion Paper suggests that such a pricing strategy is abuse of 
dominant position when the firm has a predatory intent. This approach can 
be very misleading firstly in cases where the competitors are also operating 
at the same efficiency level with the dominant firm. In this case, the 
competitors will not want to leave the market when the price is set below 
the average total cost by the dominant firm because it will be profitable for 
them to stay in the business as long as the price is above the average 
avoidable cost. The Discussion Paper suggests analyzing the financial 
market if they are willing to finance the other small firms in the market. 
However, this attitude is also wrong because the capital market will 
definitely want to finance the firms operating at the same efficiency level 
with the dominant firm. Even if the capital markets do not want to finance, 
these firms would prefer to stay in this business to make some money 
instead of making no money. Finding the predatory intent is also a wrong 
approach because all the competitive firms want to eliminate or decrease the 
competition in a market. Any firm in a market will want to cut the prices if 
it makes commercial sense and this strategy is promising an increase in the 
sales of the firm. Therefore, whether it is dominant or not, this strategy will 
impair the competition in the market and the other firms never react as 
leaving the market.
63
 
 
Regarding the third scenario in which the dominant firm’s price is above the 
average total cost, the Discussion Paper brings a very radical approach and 
considers it an abuse in some circumstances.  According to Discussion 
Paper, the price above average total cost can be considered as abuse if the 
economies of scale are significant; the production of new entrants is below 
the minimum efficient scale; and the price set by the dominant firm is below 
the average total cost of the entrant. Therefore, the Discussion Paper is 
broadening this concept to all the pricing strategies of a dominant firm 
which is relatively lower. When the dominant firm engages in limit pricing, 
it can be liable under Article 82 because of the predatory nature of its 
pricing strategy but it can be again liable under Article 82 when it practices 
excessive pricing. Moreover, the new entrant although it has lower 
efficiency level, it will definitely increase its efficiency and will not leave 
the market because of the prices above average total costs. Therefore, the 
Discussion Paper in this issue does not bring any solution while it makes the 
economic analysis of predatory pricing very complex. Moreover, the main 
objective of the competition law is determined as increasing the consumer 
welfare by the Discussion paper, while this new attitude encourages the 
dominant firm to increase the prices which harms the consumers and does 
not provide any real benefits for encouraging entry and long-term 
competition.
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4.2.2.2. Tying and Bundling 
 
For many years, tying cases are analyzed under formalistic approach and 
considered as abuse of dominant position in EU competition law without 
considering the actual effect on competition and consumers. The Discussion 
Paper aims to bring a more economics-based approach to tying cases with a 
focus on their effect on competition. However, the suggested framework to 
analyze these cases is still very much affected by the formalistic approach 
and does not utilize the economic analysis. The paper rightly provides that 
the tying practice is generally efficiency enhancing with the aim of 
providing better quality products in cost effective ways. However, the focus 
on the paper is controversially on the anti-competitive effects of tying. The 
economic theories suggest that tying is very often pro-competitive and 
increases the efficiency while lowering the production, distribution and 
transaction costs especially in “technical tying”. 
65
 (“Technical Tying” 
means that the tied product is physically integrated in the tying product and 
it is analyzed in Microsoft case where the Windows Media Player was tied 
to the Windows Operating System.)
66
 Although the economic theories 
proved that “technical tying” improves the performance, functionality, 
quality of the products, the Discussion Paper shows that the Commission is 
still loyal to the formalistic approach towards tying cases and fails to 
recognize the new economic theories. The new approach should have 
considered the tying and bundling efficiency enhancing and non-abusive 
unless proven otherwise.
67
  
 
The Discussion Paper identifies four conditions for the tying conduct to be 
liable under Article 82. Firstly, the firm in question should be dominant in 
the tying market. The second condition which provides that the tying and 
tied and products should be two distinct products is a more controversial 
condition. According to the Discussion Paper the products that would be 
purchased separately in consumers’ perspective are distinct products. The 
broad application of this approach can be very misleading as any product 
can be considered as bundle because the consumers are very often willing to 
buy the products separately. The Paper should have been more focused on 
the effect on competition and consumer welfare instead of depending on the 
formalistic definitions. 
68
Actually, the right question for identifying the 
distinct products should be if the consumers would be really willing to buy 
the tying product without the tied product or not. Moreover, using this test 
for the technically integrated products which were sold distinctively 
previously can be also misleading. The right question should be whether the 
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company has any efficiency gains as a result of tying these products or not 
as the technical tying should be efficiency enhancing according to the new 
economic theories.
69
  
 
The third criterion is that the tying or bundling should result in foreclosure 
of competitors in the tied market. The Discussion Paper suggest that when 
the dominant firm ties a sufficient part of the market, the Commission will 
likely come to the conclusion that the conduct has a foreclosure effect on the 
competitors. 
70
 This attitude definitely does not reflect the fact that tying 
arrangements are efficiency enhancing. The standard to prove its abusive 
nature is very low. The foreclosure effect on competitors is usually low 
when there is still demand for unbundled products because the other 
companies will find a way to make profit in such a case. Moreover, 
according to the Discussion Paper’s standard, it is very easy to establish the 
foreclosure effect of tying arrangement. Showing the real anti-competitive 
effect of the tying arrangement on the market and consumer welfare is not 
necessary as long as the Commission proves that the conduct has potential 
foreclosure effect on competition.  This attitude will have deterring effect on 
the dominant firm to introduce bundled products although the dominant firm 
is certain that there will not be actual effect on competition.
71
 
 
Finally, the last criterion provides that it is the defendant firm to prove that 
its tying conduct has efficiency gains which outweigh the negative impact 
on competition. However, the new economic theory suggests that this 
attitude of the Commission discourages the tying arrangements which are 
efficiency enhancing. It should be the Commission or the national 
competition authorities to prove the negative effect on the competition and 
consumers once the dominant firm shows the efficiencies. The Discussion 
Paper should have suggested this system because it is also more appropriate 
that the competition authorities or the Commission makes the efficiency 
analysis as they have better resources and analytical tools for such an 
analysis. 
72
 
 
4.2.2.3. Rebates and Single Branding  
 
The new economic theories support that the discounts and rebates should be 
encouraged even for the dominant firms as they are consumer welfare 
enhancing and pro-competitive while they are harmful for the competition in 
exceptional circumstances. The dominant firm should not be compelled to 
justify its conduct as the exclusive dealing arrangements are very often 
found as pro-competitive by the economic theories. Although the pro-
competitive effect of single branding and rebates is emphasized at the 
beginning by the Discussion Paper, it later provides that they can be loyalty 
enhancing in some cases. Making an assumption that the single branding is 
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anti-competitive can be very misleading and harmful for competition. For 
instance in some markets, it is an ordinary commercial practice that the 
buyer demands for an exclusive purchasing agreement in return of low 
prices. And when the dominant firm makes this excusive dealing, it affects 
the substantial amount of the market. However, this practice is just an 
ordinary commercial practice and there is no proved harm on competition. 
Therefore, the Discussion Paper should have started the analysis with the 
presumption that the single branding and rebates are usually consumer 
welfare and efficiency enhancing.
73
  Moreover, it is stated that when the 
dominant firm uses rebates to maintain or strengthen its position in the 
market, it is abuse of dominant position as the growth of competition is 
hindered. However, such aggressive strategies exist when there is effective 
competition in the market. It is very normal for the dominant firm to adopt 
such strategies to increase or maintain its market share and the Discussion 
Paper also allows the dominant firm to compete effectively. Therefore, it is 
hard to understand why the dominant firm is forbidden from adopting 
rebates which would result in long-term aggressive price competition.
74
 
According to the general attitude of the Discussion Paper, when the 
existence of dominance is established, applying rebate by the dominant firm 
is almost always abuse of dominance under Article 82 as it will somehow 
distort competition. 
 
The Discussion Paper provides five conditions which must be met for a 
rebate system to be abuse under Article 82. These four conditions include 
complex calculations and formulas to make an economic analysis. Firstly 
the method provided has many artificial assumptions and is not consistent 
with the recent economic theories. Moreover, the calculation method is too 
complex to be applied by the firms in their daily business activities.
75
 The 
conditional rebate system discussed in the Paper is actually a simple 
quantity discount system which is proved to be welfare enhancing. When 
the percentage rebate is small enough, the rebates should never be 
considered as abuse. Regarding the fidelity rebates which is a sign of 
aggressive pricing strategy and effective competition in the market should 
be abuse just in case of the inability of competitors to offer the same kind of 
rebates or different ones. Moreover, the theoretical formulation provided is 
very inconsistent with the new economic theories. Therefore all the 
complexity, inconsistency and ambiguity in the Discussion Paper results in 
legal uncertainty. The system is especially harmful in innovative markets 
where the dominant firm engages in R&D and does not manufacture the 
products. In this case, the dominant firm should give incentive to 
manufacturers in the downstream market to expand sales and to make 
further investment. The fidelity rebates decrease the cost of the 
manufacturer and helps it to recover the huge fixed costs. Since the discount 
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it got from the dominant firm is reflected to the end customers, the incentive 
for manufacturer to expand its sales is created. Where the innovator is 
allowed to provide fidelity rebates to the contestable markets and to charge 
higher prices to the markets with inelastic demand, the innovator can 
recover its R&D costs and an incentive for further investment is created. 
76
 
Therefore, the Commission should adopt a more economics-based approach 
towards the rebates in especially high-tech markets to further encourage 
innovation in the EU in the long-run.     
 
The attitude of the Discussion Paper against the unconditional rebate 
schemes in which the dominant firm provides rebates independent of their 
purchasing habits is also not economics-based. According to the Discussion 
Paper, such rebate schemes are usually adopted to force the customers to 
switch to the dominant firm by charging lower prices. Therefore, the 
dominant firm is forbidden from making price discrimination and competing 
on price. However, the economic theories tell us that the rebates are the 
result of ordinary competition as the oligopoly just charges lower prices 
than the monopoly in the existence of substitutes. Therefore, by preventing 
the dominant firm to offer lower prices to increase its market share, the 
Discussion Paper is actually harming the consumers while it is protecting 
the competitors. This is in conflict with the main objectives mentioned by 
the Paper itself. Moreover, the Discussion Paper mentions that the 
unconditional rebates which are exclusionary in nature are abuse within the 
meaning of Article 82. However, this statement results in duplication as 
offering prices below average avoidable cost is analyzed under the predatory 
pricing. Stressing this issue under the rebate schemes just creates a 
disincentive for the dominant firm to engage in aggressive competition 
while it does not provide any benefit in terms of promoting effective 
competition.
77
    
 
4.2.2.4. Refusal to Supply  
 
Regarding the refusal to supply, the Discussion Paper recognizes that it may 
have negative effect on the short-run competition while a strict policy 
against refusal to supply can also hamper the long-run investment 
incentives. However, the suggested approach and the method of analysis are 
still very close to the old approach and are not economics-based. Every year, 
the national competition authorities and the Commission get many cases 
regarding the refusal to supply but almost all of them are raised by the firms 
which are complaining about not getting supply from the dominant firm 
while there is no effect on competition. In these cases, there is usually very 
little or no effect on competition or the effect is pro-competitive and 
consumer welfare enhancing. Therefore, a new type of analysis in refusal to 
supply was very significant to avoid compelling the dominant firm to supply 
while there is no substantial anti-competitive effect. However, it is clear that 
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the new approach suggested by the Discussion Paper failed to bring a new 
economic-based approach to refusal to supply cases. The Paper categorizes 
the refusal to supply cases in two groups: where the dominant firm is 
operating in the downstream market and where it is not operating in the 
downstream market. The Discussion Paper provides that refusal to deal can 
be abuse even if the dominant firm is not active in the downstream market. 
If the dominant firm is active in the downstream market, it can be abuse 
only if there few competitors in that market, this creates too much 
uncertainly. To consider a refusal to deal conduct abuse under Article 82, 
the actual effect on the competition should be analyzed instead of depending 
on formalistic definitions.
78
 The Paper identifies three different situations 
where the refusal to supply can be abusive: when there is an existing supply 
relationship, where the dominant firm refuses to start supply relationship 
(including the IPRs cases) and when the input is information which is 
necessary for interoperability.  
 
For the first case, the Discussion Paper provides four conditions to consider 
it abusive: the conduct should be characterized as termination of the supply 
arrangement; the firm refusing to supply should have dominant position; the 
conduct should have negative effect on competition; and the conduct should 
not be justified objectively or by efficiencies. 
79
 The Discussion Paper 
suggests that if a dominant firm ceases to supply a firm which made 
investment depending on the existence of the supply, it is definitely abusive. 
Moreover, in case of terminating a supply relationship, there is no 
requirement to show the indispensability. However, the economic theories 
provide that continuing a supply relationship is not necessarily pro-
competitive. It should be the firms to freely decide whom it makes business 
except for the cases where the firm in the downstream market is very much 
depended on the supplier. Otherwise, compelling the dominant firm for the 
continuation of its existing supply relationships creates a disincentive to 
start supply arrangements in the first place.
80
  
 
Regarding the cases where the dominant firm refuses to commence to 
supply, the indispensability criterion is added to the list provided above. The 
Discussion Paper provides that the incentive to invest and innovate should 
be protected and the dominant firm has the right to get compensation for 
supplying a certain service or products. Therefore, the dominant firm may 
also exclude some firms from accessing to its facilities for a certain period 
of time. This should be allowed to create incentive to invest and innovate 
although it can eliminate or hamper the effective competition in this period 
of time. The analysis of such cases is especially complicated when the 
supplied product or service has IPR.
81
 The Discussion Paper maintains the 
position taken by the ECJ in IMS Health
82
 Case. The Court ruled in IMS 
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Health Case that the dominant firm has to provide license when the license 
is essential for the firm requesting the supply to produce new goods and 
services for which there is potential customer demand. The dominant firm 
cannot be compelled to license when the firm is just duplicating the goods 
and services already offered by the dominant firm. Although this attitude is 
more economics-friendly, the Discussion Paper later broadens this 
interpretation and provides that the dominant firm must also supply when its 
IPR-protected technology is indispensable for the competitors to further 
develop technology in this area even if the competitors are not certainly able 
to produce a new product or service. 
83
 Although the Paper suggests that the 
IPR holder should be compelled to license in very exceptional 
circumstances, it broadens the interpretation of the Court and forces the IPR 
holder to supply license when the technology in question is indispensable 
for “follow-on innovation”.
84
 It is stated that the refusal to supply the IPR-
protected technology should not hamper the innovative capacity of the 
competitors and at the end the consumer welfare. However, the new 
economic theories are not really supporting this approach which argues for 
weakening the IPR to enhance the innovation in the long-run. This approach 
definitely discourages the dominant firm to invest and innovate and this 
attitude of the Commission will seriously harm the innovation in EU in the 
long-run.
85
  
 
Regarding the last type of refusal to supply, the Discussion Paper supports 
position taken in Microsoft Decision and states that the “high standards” 
applied in ordinary refusal to supply IPR cases cannot be applied in refusal 
to supply the interoperability information. Therefore, it is more likely to find 
abuse when the dominant firm refuses to supply the interoperability 
information. This approach is also harmful for innovation as the competitors 
of dominant firm which are not able to directly convert the IPR-protected 
technology into a new product can easily exploit this attitude to access the 
IPR of the dominant firm.
86
 Moreover, in this case the Discussion Paper 
tells about the concept of “leveraging market power” from one market to 
another by refusing to supply interoperability information. However, the 
Paper fails to identify in which circumstances “leveraging market power” 
can be abusive. Therefore, it creates a situation where the intervention can 
be very easy and unexpected.  Moreover, the Discussion Paper does not give 
any reason why there is less protection against the trade secrets while the 
trade secrets are accepted as equally important as the other types of IPRs to 
promote innovation. 
87
 This uncertainty and ambiguity will hamper the 
incentive of the IPR holders to further invest in R&D and innovate and will 
dramatically affect the consumer welfare in EU in a very negative way. And 
this result is definitely conflicting with the objectives mentioned at the 
beginning of the Discussion Paper. 
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4.2.3. Aftermarkets  
At the end of the analysis of the exclusionary conducts, the Discussion 
Paper tells about the aftermarkets. The new position of the Discussion Paper 
against the aftermarkets is supported because of its effects-based approach. 
The economic theories suggest that the firms having smaller market shares 
in the primary market usually have dominant positions in the aftermarket. 
The firm having dominant position in the primary market should not be 
considered to maintain the same position in the aftermarket and when there 
is a separate aftermarket, the dominance analysis should be held both in the 
primary market and the aftermarket. 
89
  
 
4.2.4. Objective Justification and Efficiency 
Defense 
 When it is established that the firm has dominant position in the relevant 
market and the conduct of the firm is abuse within the meaning of Article 
82, the firm can escape the prohibition if it can provide an objective 
justification for its behavior or if its conduct produces efficiency which 
outweigh the negative effect on competition. There are two types of 
objective justification. Firstly, the firm may prove that its conduct is 
necessary because of the factors external to it. The dominant firm should 
show that its conduct is necessary for all the firms in the market to be able 
to produce or distribute a product. Secondly, dominant firm may show that 
its conduct is necessary to meet the competition in the market and to be able 
to compete effectively. This defense can only be used when the firm is able 
to prove that its low prices are the result of competitors’ low prices. When it 
is found to be a reasonable justification, the dominant firm should show that 
its conduct is suitable to achieve the legitimate aim, necessary and 
proportionate considering the aim of Article 82.  
 
The Discussion Paper states that the proportionality test requires a detailed 
analysis to protect the interest of the dominant firm to minimize its losses 
and also the interest of the competitors to enter and expand. This statement 
is very conflicting as the main aim of the Discussion Paper is to protect the 
consumers but the test itself does not really consider the consumer welfare. 
It is not definitely in the consumers’ interest to prevent the dominant firm to 
charge lower prices to save the interests of the competitors. The Paper 
makes a misleading presumption that the protection of the interests of the 
competitors amounts to protecting the interests of the consumers. However, 
the economic theories suggest that this assumption is only acceptable in 
exceptional circumstances. 
90
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Regarding the efficiency defense, the Discussion Paper is following the two 
stage test of Article 81 and provides four conditions that should be met. 
Firstly, the conduct of the firm should produce efficiency. Secondly, the 
conduct in question should be necessary to gain these efficiencies. 
Moreover, the efficiencies produced should benefit the consumers and 
competition should not be eliminated as a result of the conduct in question.
91
 
Firstly, the Commission should not follow the two stage analysis made 
under Article 81 in which the defendant firm has the burden of proof to 
show the efficiency gains. Instead, the efficiency analysis should be an 
integral part of the Article 82 analysis in which the plaintiff is having the 
burden of proof to show that the abusive conduct cannot be justified under 
Article 82. If the conduct is producing efficiencies which outweigh the ant-
competitive effects, the conduct should not be considered as abuse within 
the meaning of Article 82.
92
 In addition to that, the competition authorities 
and the Commission have better resources to get the relevant data and make 
the efficiency analysis. 
93
 
 
 Moreover, these conditions are very hard to meet especially when the 
foreclosure effect of the conduct is proved. The Discussion Paper states that 
it is enough to show the “likely foreclosure effect” whereas the dominant 
firm should prove that certainly the competition will not be eliminated.  
Moreover, the dominant firm should make a complex and deep analysis of 
the conduct’s effect on the consumer welfare while the Commission can 
find the conduct as abusive based on the effect on the market.
 94
 Regarding 
the ‘indispensability’ requirement for the conduct, the Discussion Paper is 
ignoring the business and economic realities. The firms during their daily 
business practices do not make an analysis of alternative conducts having 
less impact on the competitors. Forcing the dominant firm to search for the 
less harmful conducts for the competitors would decrease the net efficiency 
level in the market because the dominant firm would go for the most 
efficient alternative without the fear of being liable under Article 82.
95
  
 
The last condition is also conflicting with the general attitude of the Paper as 
even if the dominant firm proves the efficiency gain which will enhance the 
consumer welfare, it can still be liable because of the harmful effect on the 
competitors.
 
The Paper is placing the interests of the competitors over the 
goal of improving consumer welfare and efficiency in the EU.
96
 According 
to the Discussion Paper, if the firm has a market share of more than 75 
percent, the efficiency gain is not the most important goal to be achieved. 
This attitude is conflicting with the Treaty and Article 82 as the conducts of 
the dominant firm producing efficiency gains outweighing the negative 
impacts on competition should not liable just because of the dominant firm’s  
high market share or less efficient firms in the market.  The economic 
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theories do not suggest any discriminatory treatment against the firms 
having market share more than 75 percent whereas it is suggested that such 
a high market share is usually the result of effective competition which 
forces the dominant firm to adopt aggressive pricing and investment 
strategies.
97
 
 
To sum up, the attitude and proposed analysis of the Discussion Paper for 
efficiency defense far from being economics-friendly and the conditions 
mentioned are very hard to be met by the dominant firm. These high 
standards to prove the efficiency gain would not be a problem but the initial 
stage of analysis of the exclusionary conduct is very inclusive. Therefore, in 
almost every case the dominant firm should use the efficiency defense to 
escape from the prohibition of Article 82 while it is made extremely 
difficult. 
98
 
 
4.3. The Commission’s Article 82 
Guidance 
 
Three years after the publication of the Discussion Paper, the Commission 
published its Guidance Paper on the application of Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses in December 3, 2008
99
. The Commission 
prioritizes the cases in which exclusionary conduct of the dominant firm has 
harmful effect on consumers.  The aim is to clarify the scope of the 
Commission’s intervention in the conducts of the dominant firm considering 
the current controversial economic and legal discussions. The Guidance 
Paper is important as it proves the intent of the Commission to bring a 
more-economics approach.
100
 It is interesting that on the day of the 
publication of the Guidelines, an economist was appointed to the top 
position of DG Competition that is the Directorate-General Dealing with the 
competition law enforcement.
101
 Although the Guidelines is a good step 
towards a more economics friendly approach in Article 82 and provides a 
more flexible approach towards dominant firms, the Guidance is mostly in 
line with the analytical framework proposed by the Discussion Paper. For 
instance, despite all criticism about the method of analysis in Article 82, the 
Commission followed the same way of analysis used in Article 81(3).  
Moreover, as it is analyzed in the previous section, the attitude towards the 
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dominant firms having more than 75 percent market share has not been 
changed. Despite the suggestions of new economic theories, according to 
the Guidelines, it is not possible to justify the exclusionary conduct of these 
firms when they intend to strengthen or maintain its position in the market. 
The Commission also maintains the same approach of the Discussion Paper 
to a large extent regarding the exclusionary conducts. 
102
 
 
 
Regarding the predatory pricing, the Commission maintained its strict 
approach while stressed that it is very likely to establish the abusive nature 
of the conduct if the price of the dominant firm is below the average 
avoidable cost.  Although the Discussion was criticized a lot regarding the 
attitude towards the question of recoupment, it appears from the Guidelines 
that it is still very difficult to escape from the prohibition under Article 82 
even if the dominant firm shows that it did not recoup its losses. Moreover, 
the Commission does not really bring a new approach regarding the tying 
cases while adding that they can be efficiency enhancing in some cases. In 
Guidelines, it is stated that the permanent ties such as technical ties are more 
problematic than the temporary one while the larger number of products in 
bundle is also considered as a disadvantage in the tying case analysis. 
103
 
The Guidance Paper conflicted with new economic theories by stressing the 
anticompetitive harm of technological tying while ignoring the possible 
benefits it may bring. 
104
   
 
While mostly maintaining the same type of attitude with the Discussion 
Paper in case of single branding and rebates, the Commission brought a new 
approach in the application of “as-efficient competitor” test.
105
 The 
Commission will investigate the cost structure and the price of the dominant 
firm and if not available, the competitors’ cost and price will be determined. 
If the data shows that the efficient competitor of the dominant firm is able to 
effectively compete with the dominant firm, it is unlikely that the 
Commission will intervene. The Commission uses the long-run average 
incremental cost and average avoidable cost as the benchmark to analyze the 
rebate system in question.
106
  Although the test aims to bring a more 
economics-based approach in case of rebates, it should be noted that the 
determination of long-run average incremental cost and relevant range of 
demand will not be an easy task. 
 
The attitude of the Guidance Paper against the refusal to supply is maybe 
the only area that the Commission really has departed from the Discussion 
Paper. The Commission brought a common approach against the three types 
of refusal to supply cases and proposed one test for the discontinuation of 
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the supply relationship, refusing to supply a new customer and refusing to 
supply an IPR. 
107
  
 
To sum up, the Commission showed its intention to move away from its 
formalistic approach and to apply an effects-based approach. However, 
Guidance Paper is very much in line with the Discussion Paper while it is 
maybe shorter, general and clearer compared to the Discussion Paper.
108
 
While Guidance aims to focus on the effect on consumers rather than the 
formalistic definitions of the abusive conduct, the proposed analysis of 
consumer harm is not clear and well-defined.
109
 Therefore, it can be noted 
that the Guidance Paper did not gain as much attention as the Discussion 
Paper because it did not provide a real improvement to the Discussion 
Paper.  
 
4.4. Conclusion  
 
In this section, the new approach to the Article 82 on the exclusionary 
conducts of the dominant firm brought by the Commission’s Discussion 
Paper in 2005 is analyzed. The aim of the Discussion Paper was to bring a 
more economics-based approach which is closer to Chicago School and US 
antitrust.  Therefore, the objectives mentioned by the Commission are 
determined as increased efficiency and consumer welfare. Although it is a 
very significant step which proves the intent of the Commission for an 
economics-based analysis in Article 82, the Commission failed to do so in 
practice while being loyal to the old approach in the method of analyzing 
the exclusionary abuses in many points. Although the Commission stresses 
the possible efficiency and consumer welfare enhancing role of the 
exclusionary abuses many times, the focus in the detailed analysis is on the 
anti-competitive effect of the conduct. Moreover, while finding the 
dominance, the Commission ignored the new economic theories which 
suggest focusing on entry barriers in the determination of dominance instead 
of the market share. The static analysis of market in the old approach is 
maintained while the market share of the dominant firm is maintained as the 
decisive factor in the dominance analysis. The Commission also tells about 
escaping the prohibition of Article 82 through objective justification and 
efficiency defense. However, the approach suggested for this part is also not 
economics-friendly and did not change the old approach significantly. 
Finally, last year the Commission published the Guidance Paper on Article 
82. However, as it is analyzed in the previous section, the Guidance Paper 
did not propose a dramatic change to the old approach while generally being 
in line with the Discussion Paper.  
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5. The Future of Article 82: The 
Theory of Market Leaders 
and Suggestions for The 
Commission  
 
The new economic theories after Chicago and Post-Chicago era stress the 
necessity of a new approach for the abuse of dominant position. The old 
approach against the dominant position protects the competitors of the 
dominant firm rather than giving the priority to enhancing consumer welfare 
and increasing the efficiency. The reason of such a change in the attitude of 
the economic theories is that the structure of the markets has changed and 
the development of New Economy which is characterized by very dynamic 
and innovative markets. With the Discussion Paper, the EU started to 
develop in favor of more economics-based approach and recognized the 
importance of economic analysis in Article 82 cases. However, as it is 
analyzed in the previous section it failed in many parts of the proposed 
analysis. Therefore, the EU competition law needs a new approach in the 
future which can be applied both in the old market structures and New 
Economy.  
 
The old suggestions of Harvard School which base its arguments in 
traditional market structures have lost all its viability in the recent years. 
While the US has recognized this fact many years ago and updated the 
antitrust rules based on the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the EU is still 
under the influence of Harvard School and maybe Post-Chicago School 
which is not as liberalist as Chicago School.  The EU was reluctant for the 
application of new economic theories to the competition policy because of 
the reasons mentioned in the first section.  
 
The theory of market leaders which gives full effect to the effects-based 
analysis stands as a viable approach which can be utilized by the EU 
competition law. In a very simple way, the theory suggests that the 
dominant firm behaves in an anti-competitive way when the number of 
firms in the market is determined exogenously. However, it only behaves in 
aggressive way when the entry into the market is endogenous and this 
situation is the most commonly observed one. In this case, the dominant 
firm follows very aggressive strategies in which it invests a lot in R&D, 
advertising and further innovation and produces more to reduce costs and 
improve quality. Therefore, it decreases its costs and keeps prices very low 
which results in higher market share. Such an aggressive strategy can be 
harmful for competitors but the benefits to consumers are undeniable. 
Opposite to the belief of old theories, the markets with high concentration 
are usually very efficient and the competition is very effective. The 
dominant firm especially follows this aggressive strategy in New 
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Economy.
110
  The traditional Post-Chicago School which has relatively 
more effect on EU competition policy suggests that in such a market the 
aggressive pricing strategies with predatory purpose are anti-competitive 
while the new theory of market leaders defines such strategies as pro-
competitive and consumer welfare and efficiency enhancing. The same 
conclusion can be drawn for the other aggressive strategies like bundling 
and rebates. Therefore, the EU competition Policy should change its attitude 
towards aggressive strategies and should accept that these strategies do not 
have exclusionary effect in real life and improve the allocative efficiency 
and consumer welfare.  
 
The EU competition authorities should intervene only when the entry 
barriers are very high and the dominant firm is not threatened by the new 
entrants. The Post-Chicago School rightly recognizes that the dominant 
firm’s behaviors are anti-competitive in this market structure. Even in case 
of excessive monopoly pricing, the competition authorities in EU should 
hesitate to intervene as long as the entry is endogenous especially in high-
tech markets. In this case, the market leader will aggressively invest in R&D 
to further innovate with the profits it earned from excessive pricing with the 
fear of effective future competition. And increased investment in innovation 
will increase the consumer welfare in the long-run.  
 
Although, the Discussion Paper starts a good initiative to discuss further on 
new approaches, it ignored all these economic theories and maintained the 
old strict competition policy against dominant firms. The Paper starts with 
the assumption that the conducts of the dominant firm which are defined as 
exclusionary are abuse within the meaning of Article 82 and if the market 
share of the dominant firm is high in the relevant market, it is a great 
disadvantage during the analysis despite the suggestions of the new 
economic theories. However, the Paper brings a novelty to the old approach 
and recognized the efficiency gains of aggressive strategies of dominant 
firm in the defense part. However, this novelty has no practical implication 
on the dominant firms having market share of above 75 percent. However, 
the EU competition policy should recognize that the analysis of Article 82 
cases has nothing to do with the market share in the new economic theories, 
the theory of market leaders. In a static dominance analysis, the firm may 
have huge market share but the thing which matters is whether the entry to 
the market is endogenous or not.  
 
A similar conclusion can be derived even when there are high entry barriers 
and fixed costs. In this case, the dominant firm produces more in a more 
efficient way and keeps the prices low despite the belief of EU approach. 
For instance in a market where the product differentiation is not significant 
and the fixed costs are very high to start business
111
, many small firms can 
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share the total production and set the price equal to average cost. In such a 
market, the dominant firm or a monopoly may start producing high 
quantities and keep the prices very low to deter entry. To prevent the entry 
in the market, the market leader operates in full efficiency; benefits from 
economies of scale; makes the production process very cheap; and at the end 
keeps the prices very low. This increased efficiency and consumer welfare 
arguments are also true when the product differentiation is important. In this 
case, the consumers will have lower variety of products because of the high 
entry barriers but are able to get some products at very low prices. This type 
of conclusion is very similar to Chicago Approach which has almost no 
effect on EU competition law but with a more generalized framework. 
Therefore, the competition authorities in EU should not intervene because 
the consumers benefit from very low prices and great cost efficiency in such 
markets. Therefore, the EU competition rules stop preventing the market 
leader from creating entry barriers as it is the most beneficial way for the 
society.    
 
Regarding the analysis of dominance, the EU approach in which the 
dominance is considered as the synonym of high market share should be 
changed. The theory of market leaders suggests that the correlation between 
market share and effective competition can be positive. The threat of 
effective competition forces the dominant firm to adopt aggressive strategies 
which results in rising market share. Therefore, the EU competition law 
should make a deep and dynamic economic analysis to decide if the firm is 
dominant or not instead of basing the whole argument on the market share.   
 
As it is analyzed in the previous section, the EU approach to bundling is 
also very obsolete and needs be updated. The Chicago School first stressed 
the efficiency enhancing effect of bundling and the positive effect on 
consumer welfare. The new economic theories suggest that the EU law 
should not start the analysis of bundling cases with the presumption which 
tells that they are abusive. The theory of market leaders suggest that 
bundling is an aggressive and pro-competitive strategy usually without any 
entry deterrence purpose and may increase consumer welfare even without 
taking into account the efficiency reasons. With bundling, the consumers 
benefit from low prices because of the larger scale economies and as a result 
the consumer welfare increases. If the entry is endogenous in the secondary 
market, punishing the dominant firm for its bundling conduct would actually 
harm the consumers. If the bundling creates technological efficiencies and 
the bundled products are complementary, there will be very great efficiency 
gains. All these new economic analysis strengthens the conclusion that the 
bundling is pro-competitive and the EU’s attitude against them should be 
changed. In the Discussion Paper, there is no need to prove the actual 
foreclosure effect on competition while it is enough to show the likely effect 
based on the formalistic assumptions. Such a policy prevents the dominant 
firm to bring new bundled products to market and harm the consumer 
welfare in the long-run.  
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The issue of economics-based approach in analysis of Article 82 cases is 
especially important to further increase the innovation activities of  the EU 
in the future.  As it is stressed in Economic Focus of the Economist
112
, in 
modern economy, it is very often the dominant firms making huge 
investment in R&D and bringing innovative products to the market. The 
theory of market leaders proves that the dominant firm has more incentive to 
invest in R&D and innovate than the outsiders when the entry to the market 
is endogenous. Because of its huge investment in innovations, it has higher 
market share and remain dominant for a long time. Therefore, there is no 
point of the EU competition policy to encourage further entry into such 
markets by harming the power of dominant firm. The dominant firm already 
operates in the most efficient way and engages in innovation. The high 
market share and market power of the dominant firm in high-tech markets is 
the sign of effective competition. The Microsoft decision is the proof of the 
Commission’s strict competition policy against the dominant firms 
operating in high-tech market. This attitude should be changed and the 
Commission should be more careful against these cases as the dominant 
firm in high-tech markets usually applies these strategies just to survive 
from effective competition.  
 
Another harmful attitude for the innovative activities of the dominant firm 
can be observed in the refusal to supply cases. As it is analyzed in the 
previous section, the proposed analysis in the Discussion Paper and the 
Microsoft decision creates too much uncertainty regarding the refusal to 
supply. The Commission makes a broad interpretation of the dominant 
firm’s obligation to supply the IPR protected technology while the dominant 
firm should be forced to do so in very exceptional cases.  Especially this 
attitude will have serious consequences for the consumer welfare in EU as it 
will harm the incentive of the dominant firm to invest in innovation by 
limiting its intellectual property rights. The theory of market leaders suggest 
for a careful economic analysis and economic-based approach in refusal to 
supply cases. The Commission should review its policy against these cases 
and give higher protection to the IPRs of the dominant firm if it wants to 
improve the innovative capacity of EU in the future.
113
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6. Conclusion  
 
The attitude of the Commission and the Community Courts towards the 
application of Article 82 to the exclusionary conducts of the dominant firms 
has significant effect on the consumer welfare, total efficiency, innovative 
activities and the overall economic development in the European Union. 
The Article 82 was designed to serve to the common objectives of the 
Community in which the further integration and unification are the 
priorities. Under the effect of these objectives, the Commission and the 
Community Courts have followed a very strict policy against dominant 
firms with significant amount of intervention by the Commission. However, 
the market structures have changed and accordingly the economic theories 
trying to bring explanation for the markets and the firms have changed. The 
formalistic approach which provides definitions for the exclusionary 
conducts of the dominant firms which are abuse within the meaning of 
Article 82 have been outdated by the recent economic theories. The old 
definitions which consider the refusal to supply, rebates or bundling anti-
competitive lost their viability. The American authorities have realized this 
fact and updated the competition policy against the dominant firms. The EU 
started a great initiative with the Discussion Paper to discuss and update the 
application of Article 82 but the steps taken are not enough and further 
improvement is inevitable.  
 
Firstly, the analysis of dominance should be changed. The high market share 
or high concentration should not be considered as evidence to market power. 
The determination of market share should not have the central importance in 
the dominance analysis. Based on the new economic theories, whether the 
entry is endogenous or not should be determinant for the Commission. The 
static dominance analysis should be changed to dynamic analysis in which 
the entry barriers and other structural elements in the market are significant. 
Especially the attitude towards the firms with more than 75 percent of the 
market should be relieved as the theory market leaders suggest that this high 
market share is usually (when the entry barriers are low) evidence to high 
efficiency, low cost production and prices, significant investment in R&D 
and high innovation. The Commission should recognize that there is no 
certain positive correlation between market power and market share.  
 
Regarding the exclusionary conducts, the Commission should start the 
analysis with the presumption that these conducts are pro-competitive and 
enhancing the consumer welfare and efficiency. The new economic theories 
provide that the formalistic approach is wrong while assuming these 
conducts as anti-competitive but they can be justified based on objective 
justification or efficiency defence. This method of analysis which is also 
used in Article 81 cases should be changed. The Commission should start 
the analysis with the fact that these exclusionary conducts of the dominant 
firms are pro-competitive and the burden of proof to prove the opposite 
should be on the Commission.  This is very important as the Commission, 
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the Community Courts and the Competition Authorities in the EU have 
better resources and tools to make such a complex analysis.  
 
During that analysis, the focus of the Commission should not be on the 
definitions of the conducts but should be on the real effect of these conducts 
on the market. Instead of assuming the anti-competitive effects of the 
exclusionary conducts of the dominant firms, the Commission should 
examine the real effect on the consumer welfare and efficiency. It should be 
noted that significant intervention to the activities of the dominant firms 
hampers the innovation and economic development in the long-run. The 
common objectives of the Community are important but the economic 
performance of the EU is also very important. Therefore, during the 
analysis, the Commission should be thorough to respect the freedom of the 
dominant firm in conducting business especially in case of IPRs. It is true 
that the analysis of the Commission for the application of Article 82 to 
exclusionary conducts of the dominant firms is very inclusive while it is 
made extremely difficult for the dominant firm (it is even impossible when 
the market share is more than 75 percent) to benefit from objective 
justification and efficiency defence. This attitude will have serious 
consequences on the innovation, economic development and total efficiency 
in EU if the Commission insists on its formalistic approach in near future. 
The new economic theories proved that it is the dominant firm making 
innovation and making huge investments in R&D. The Commission should 
publish new Guidelines which is in harmony with the new economic 
theories and case aw especially the recent the ones.  
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